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INTRODUCTION
In Penry v. Lynaugh, decided in 1989, a closely divided United
States Supreme Court declined to rule that execution of a person
with mental retardation is categorically prohibited by the Eight
Amendment,' holding instead that it was constitutionally per-
missible for the states to regard mental retardation as a mitigat-
ing factor rather than a preclusive one.2 The Court observed that
a national consensus supporting exemption of all defendants with
mental retardation from the death penalty had not emerged.3 Of
course, this ruling left the states free to adopt a categorical exclu-
sion, and many states subsequently did so.
• John S. Battle Professor of Law, Professor of Psychiatry and Neurobehavioral Sci-
ences, and Director, Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy, University of Virginia.
** J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (5-4 decision) ("[Tihere is insufficient evidence of a na-
tional consensus against executing mentally retarded people . . . to conclude that it is
categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.").
2. See id. at 340 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 335.
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Thirteen years later, in Atkins v. Virginia,4 a 6-3 majority
ruled that a national consensus favoring categorical exclusion of
defendants with mental retardation from capital punishment had
become evident since 1989,' and that the "'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' must be
judged by the standards that prevail at the time of the Court's
decision.6
Between Penry and Atkins, eighteen states enacted legislation
specifically banning the death penalty for people with mental re-
tardation, and similar bills were passed by at least one house of
the legislature in at least three other states.7 The Atkins Court
noted that while the number of states excluding people with men-
tal retardation had increased significantly (only two had so at the
time of Penry), not a single state had legislated in the opposite di-
rection by reinstating the death penalty for such offenders.8 Tak-
ing account of the twelve states that had abolished the death pen-
alty altogether, execution of a person with mental retardation
was forbidden in thirty states in 2002. The federal death penalty
statute also precluded death sentences for offenders with mental
retardation.9
In Atkins, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that de-
termining whether a specific individual is mentally retarded is a
sometimes controversial task, as it has been in Daryl Atkins's
own case.1 ° The Court stated that "[tlo the extent there is serious
disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders,
it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded."11 The
Court clearly anticipated continuing struggles in the effort to im-
plement its decision, and it is hardly surprising that the Court
left to the states the task of putting the new constitutional rule
into effect. 12 However, the Court did not leave the states without
some definitional guidance: Based on the definitions of mental re-
4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5. Id. at 315-16.
6. See id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
7. Id. at 314-15.
8. Id. at 313-16.
9. Id. at 314 (citing Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(l), 102
Stat. 4181, 4390, repealed by USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 109-177, § 221 120 Stat. 192, 231 (2006)).
10. Id. at 317.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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tardation enunciated by the American Association on Mental Re-
tardation and by the American Psychiatric Association,13 the
Court observed that mental retardation has three components:
subaverage intellectual functioning, significant limitations in
adaptive skills, and onset before age eighteen. 4
The Supreme Court's approach in Atkins is noteworthy for
many reasons. For example, Atkins may have marked the emer-
gence of an approach to an Eighth Amendment excessiveness
analysis accepted by a majority of the Justices-a development
further evidenced in Roper v. Simmons, in which a 5-4 majority
declared that the death penalty is constitutionally excessive as
applied to adolescent offenders who were under eighteen at the
time of the offense.'
5
One particularly striking feature of Atkins is that it enunciated
a constitutional rule that turns explicitly and entirely on a clini-
cal diagnosis. Although clinical diagnoses often serve as a thresh-
old requirement in legal "tests" of incompetence, non-
responsibility, and disability, they are almost never sufficient to
establish that the legal criteria are satisfied. Instead, the typical
legal formulation requires the party seeking to prove incompe-
tence, non-responsibility, or disability to demonstrate a signifi-
cant level of functional impairment as a result of the diagnosed
condition. The most pertinent examples in criminal law are in-
competence to proceed to trial or to plead guilty in a criminal case
(impaired ability to understand the proceedings or to assist coun-
sel),'6 and insanity or lack of criminal responsibility (impaired
ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct or to con-
form one's conduct to the requirements of the law). 7
There is much to be said in favor of a principle of diminished
responsibility in capital sentencing-e.g., precluding a death sen-
tence for an offender whose capacity to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his conduct, to exercise rational judgment, or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired
13. Id. at 308 n.3.
14. Id. at 318.
15. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
16. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See generally Richard J.
Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 539 (1993).
17. Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (1985).
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at the time of the offense. Indeed, the American Bar Association,
the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psycho-
logical Association recently have urged states to adopt such a
principle in cases involving offenders with severe mental illness.'"
In light of the strong legal tradition just described, the Su-
preme Court might have chosen to embrace a principle of dimin-
ished responsibility as a constitutional culpability requirement in
capital cases-similar to the minimum level of culpability needed
to impose a death sentence on accomplices ("reckless indifference
to human life").' 9 What is so striking about Atkins is that the
Court was persuaded to adopt a per se rule exempting all persons
with mental retardation from the death penalty based on diagno-
sis alone. This is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that
the line between being mentally retarded and being of borderline
intelligence is operationalized statistically by an admittedly arbi-
trary line on a bell curve representing performance on an IQ test
two standard deviations below the mean. In short, the diagnosis
of mental retardation is in large part a statistical construct.
The Supreme Court did not attempt to explain, in constitu-
tional terms, why the Eighth Amendment's concern with dimin-
ished culpability-the concept lying at the heart of the Court's
reasoning in Atkins-is best operationalized by exempting offend-
ers diagnosed with mental retardation rather than through a
standard test of diminished responsibility. Although the Court
can properly be faulted for failing to offer a more elaborate expla-
nation, the decision can justifiably be grounded in either of two
juridical judgments--either that no person with mental retarda-
tion is sufficiently culpable to deserve a death sentence, or that
any criterion of diminished responsibility designed to differenti-
ate the few mentally retarded offenders deserving of the death
penalty from the many who are not would likely lead, in practice,
to death sentences for too many undeserving offenders. Indeed,
capital juries may have a tendency to discount the mitigating sig-
nificance of evidence of mental retardation and severe mental ill-
ness because the offenses committed are unusually brutal or raise
concerns about future violence. A similar rationale underlies the
18. Task Force on Mental Disability & the Death Penalty, Am. Bar Ass'n, Recommen-
dation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL
& PHYsIcAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668,668-69 (2006).
19. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
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subsequent ruling in Roper v. Simmons precluding execution of
any offender who was less than eighteen at the time of the of-
fense.
The analogy with Roper v. Simmons is quite instructive. The
criminal law has long drawn responsibility-related lines based on
the ages of youthful offenders, including the common-law infancy
presumptions and the jurisdictional age lines defining the
boundaries between juvenile and criminal courts. The innovation
in the mental retardation exclusion statutes enacted between
1988 and 2002 is that they essentially analogized having a diag-
nosis of mental retardation to being below a statutorily desig-
nated age of eligibility, thereby evading the tradition of individu-
alized capacity assessments by forensic mental health pro-
fessionals that have been customarily required in the context of
criminal adjudication. When the Court decided to constitutional-
ize the exclusion in Atkins, it simply embraced the diagnostic ap-
proach-a recent innovation in the state legislatures-without
any apparent consideration of the diminished responsibility ap-
proach.
Three years later, with Atkins having laid the groundwork, the
Roper Court was willing to take the next step, drawing an admit-
tedly arbitrary constitutional line at the age of eighteen. But
there is a big practical difference between the otherwise parallel
rulings in Roper and Atkins: Whether an adolescent will be con-
stitutionally eligible for the death penalty is easily ascertained by
looking at the defendant's birth certificate. In contrast, the con-
stitutionality of a death sentence under Atkins turns exclusively
on a clinical diagnosis, thereby magnifying the importance, and
the stakes, of the clinical assessments of mental retardation and
the expert opinions based on those assessments.
In the usual forensic context, it is well understood that adjudi-
cations of competence and responsibility rest ultimately upon
value judgments and that there is often no right answer. How-
ever, the sole question in an Atkins adjudication is whether the
offender is or is not mentally retarded. Although the Supreme
Court was well aware of the uncertainties at the margins of any
mental disorder diagnosis, including the diagnosis of mental re-
tardation, it also must have assumed that the inevitable "dis-
agreement[s] .. .in determining which offenders are in fact re-
20071
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tarded"2 ° can be resolved fairly and with reasonable accuracy
based on scientific and clinical knowledge. At the very least, the
Court must have assumed that expert disagreements would rest
on articulable differences in scientific or clinical judgment, rather
than on hidden disagreements about whether the offender de-
serves a death sentence. In this sense, the very soundness of the
Atkins decision, and the integrity of Atkins adjudications, turns
on the effort made by the states to implement it in a scientifically
satisfactory manner.
Our goal in this paper is to assist state courts and legislatures
as they try to carry out the task that Atkins requires of them-
promoting fairness and accuracy in the assessment and adjudica-
tion of mental retardation. After addressing the definition of
mental retardation in Part I, we focus on its assessment in Parts
II and III, highlighting several key requirements of a scientifi-
cally and clinically adequate assessment.
Part II addresses the assessment of deficits in intellectual func-
tioning, particularly on the measurement of intelligence as repre-
sented by an intelligence quotient. Appropriate IQ tests must be
used, and the scores must be interpreted in accordance with pro-
fessional practice, taking into account the scores' statistical
meaning, the standard error of measurement, and other factors
that affect subjects' performance on these tests and the interpre-
tations of their scores.
Part III addresses deficits in adaptive behavior, the second key
component of a diagnosis of mental retardation. Adaptive behav-
ior is difficult to measure and the scientific community's under-
standing of the construct is not nearly as advanced as its under-
standing of IQ. We offer guidance on how to operationalize the
concept of adaptive behavior and how to give it meaningful con-
sideration in Atkins adjudications. Part IV briefly addresses the
practical significance of the requirement that mental retardation
be manifest before the age of eighteen. Finally, Part V discusses
the role of expert testimony and the necessary qualifications for
experts testifying on the issue of mental retardation in death pen-
alty cases.
Although the paper is designed to offer guidance to all state
courts and legislatures, Virginia is used as a case study. Perhaps
20. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
[Vol. 41:811
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this is fitting in light of the fact that the Atkins rule was enunci-
ated in a Virginia case, and that litigation continues concerning
its application to Daryl Atkins himself.21 In the wake of the Su-
preme Court's Atkins ruling in May 2003, the Virginia General
Assembly adopted legislation defining mental retardation, setting
requirements for the assessment of mental retardation, and es-
tablishing the necessary qualifications for experts. 22 The legisla-
tion was drafted under the auspices of the Virginia State Crime
Commission (the "Crime Commission"), a bipartisan body of legis-
lators from the Senate and House of Delegates. After the Su-
preme Court handed down Atkins, the Crime Commission ap-
pointed a Subcommittee to draft legislation to implement the
decision (the "Atkins Subcommittee") comprised of legislators and
representatives from various criminal justice constituencies. The
portions of the bill dealing with the definition of mental retarda-
tion, its assessment and expert qualifications-the only portions
addressed in this paper-were formulated by a Clinical Advisory
Group composed of mental health professionals appointed by the
Atkins Subcommittee.23 These provisions were embraced by the
Atkins Subcommittee and the Crime Commission largely as writ-
ten by the Clinical Advisory Group. The legislation implementing
Atkins was eventually passed by the Virginia General Assembly
with only minor amendments to the version proposed by the
Crime Commission.24
Because the provisions in the Virginia statute pertaining to as-
sessment of mental retardation are more detailed than other
state laws on this subject, they may offer useful guidance to ex-
pert evaluators and courts in other states. In addition, the ques-
21. On June 8, 2006, the Supreme Court of Virginia again remanded Daryl Atkins's
case for a new proceeding. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 631 S.E.2d 93, 102 (Va. 2006).
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.3:1.1-1.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
23. The first author of this paper (RJB) was a member of the Atkins Subcommittee
and was the Chair of the Clinical Advisory Group. Although the account of the legislative
history presented below is based largely on the public record, some observations are based
on the first author's papers and recollections. The papers are available in the Special Col-
lections of the University of Virginia Law Library.
24. As will be discussed infra, there were some bumps along the way. Although the
Senate enacted the Crime Commission bill with little change, the House of Delegates
made some substantial modifications. The bill that emerged from the Joint Conference
Committee included two changes unacceptable to the Crime Commission drafters. The
Governor sent the bill back to the General Assembly recommending that the Crime Com-
mission's approach to each of these issues be restored. The General Assembly accepted one
of the Governor's changes but not the other. With the support of the Crime Commission
drafters, the Governor signed the bill.
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tions that have arisen regarding the proper interpretation of the
Virginia statute tend to bear directly on the goal of promoting fair
and accurate assessments and adjudications. That interpretive
experience may also be of value to experts and courts in other
states. Many state supreme courts and lower courts are already
confronting the issues addressed in this article,25 underscoring
the importance of educating judges and practitioners as soon as
possible on how to approach Atkins cases in accordance with pre-
vailing scientific understanding and accepted clinical standards.
That is our goal.
I. DEFINING MENTAL RETARDATION
Although the Supreme Court in Atkins left it to the states to
enforce the new constitutional rule, Atkins did not leave each
state free to define mental retardation.26 As already indicated, it
seems clear that the Supreme Court intended for the states to
embrace a clinical definition of mental retardation, as a diagnos-
25. See, e.g., Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002) (finding absence of
mental retardation when defendant had an IQ of 76 and had been both married and
briefly employed); In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005) (declining to adopt an
IQ of 70 as a cut-off score); Trotter v. Florida, 932 So. 2d 1045, 1049-50 (Fla. 2006) (find-
ing absence of mental retardation when defendant's IQ scores ranged from 72 to 91 and
discussing the weight to be given to expert testimony); Pruitt v. Indiana, 834 N.E.2d 90,
104-08 (Ind. 2005) (discussing factors to be considered when evaluating IQ scores and as-
sessing adaptive behavior); Bowling v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 376, 384 (Ky. 2005)
(suggesting that measurement error and the Flynn effect do not need to be considered un-
der the relevant Kentucky statute and holding a bright line cut-off IQ score of 70 to be
constitutional); Louisiana v. Dunn, 831 So. 2d 862, 884, 887 (La. 2002) (holding that there
must be a hearing on the mental retardation issue when the defendant had an IQ score of
71 in order to develop the record and take, for example, standard error of measurement
and the defendant's motivation into account); Goodwin v. Missouri, 191 S.W.3d 20, 29 (Mo.
2006) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on mental
retardation because three experts testified that he was not retarded and there was no evi-
dence to the contrary); Pennsylvania v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 629-31 (Pa. 2005) (establish-
ing the definition of mental retardation in Pennsylvania and the issues that must be con-
sidered when making the determination); Howell v. Tennessee, 151 S.W.3d 450, 458
(Tenn. 2004) (holding that a for a defendant to be considered mentally retarded they must
have an IQ of 70 or below); Howard v. Texas, 153 S.W.3d 382, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(holding that there was insufficient evidence of mental retardation when only portions of
an IQ test were administered to the defendant); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d
47, 59 (Va. 2004) (holding that the defendant's mental retardation claim was frivolous be-
cause he had IQ scores of 75 and 78, both of which exceed the threshold score of 70).
26. Any definition of mental retardation used to implement Atkins must not cover a
smaller group of individuals than the definition adopted by the American Association of
Mental Retardation. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide
to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 12 (2003).
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able disorder, rather than a legally constructed definition focus-
ing on functional impairments and bearing on diminished culpa-
bility.27 The Court set out, in full, two well-established clinical
definitions of mental retardation, one from the American Associa-
tion on Mental Retardation (AAMR)2" and one from the American
Psychiatric Association (APA). 29 Although the language of these
two definitions differs somewhat, they are conceptually identical,
requiring significant deficits in intellectual functioning and adap-
tive behavior and onset before age eighteen.
Of the eighteen state statutes mentioned in Atkins, seventeen
of them use exclusively clinical criteria drawn from these defini-
tions. 30 However, some confusion is created by the fact that the
Court did not specifically disavow the approach taken in Kansas,
the one state that had adopted a diminished capacity approach
before the Atkins decision. 31 The Kansas statute defined being
mentally retarded as "having significantly subaverage general in-
tellectual functioning . . . to an extent which substantially im-
pairs one's capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct
or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law," using the
Model Penal Code's criteria for the insanity defense.32 However, a
statute using a definition based on diminished capacity to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of specific conduct or to conform that con-
duct to the law would run afoul of the rationale for the Atkins de-
cision because it would allow a defendant to receive the death
penalty as long as he possessed whichever capacities were re-
quired by the statute, even if he is mentally retarded according to
the prevailing professional criteria. 3
27. See supra pp. 813-14.
28. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002). As of January 1, 2007 the Ameri-
can Association on Mental Retardation has changed its name to the American Association
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. Press Release, Am. Ass'n on Mental Re-
tardation, World's Oldest Organization on Intellectual Disability Has a Progressive New
Name (Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.aamr.org/AboutAAIDD/name-change-PR
dreen.htm.
29. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (2002).
30. See Richard J. Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association's Resource Document
on Mental Retardation and Capital Sentencing: Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 32 J. AM
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 304, 305 (2004).
31. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
33. Furthermore, a diminished capacity approach would carry a greater risk of expert
disagreement and arbitrary application by judges since capacities to appreciate criminal-
ity or wrongfulness or to refrain from specific conduct at some time in the past cannot be
20071
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Mental retardation has been defined by two prominent profes-
sional organizations. At the time of the Atkins decision, the
AAMR was using its 1992 definition of mental retardation, which
the Court quoted in its opinion:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present func-
tioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or
more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication,
self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental
retardation manifests before age 18.
34
The fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV-
TR), published in 2000, also quoted in Atkins, defines mental re-
tardation as:
[Slignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion
A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive func-
tioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication,
self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18
years (Criterion C). 35
The AAMR definition was updated in 2002 to recognize that
the ten specific examples of adaptive skills listed in the 1992
definition and reflected in the APA definition, fall into three
groups of cognitive, social, and practical skills. The AAMR now
defines mental retardation as follows: "Mental retardation is a
disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellec-
tual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in concep-
tual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability origi-
nates before age 18. "36
measured with validated instruments, unlike intelligence and adaptive behavior. Bills to
modify the Kansas statute have been introduced but not yet adopted. See, e.g., H.B. 2396,
2007 Sess. (Kan.).
34. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (quoting AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINI-
TION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 5 (Luckasson et al. eds., 9th ed. 1992).
35. Id. (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., text rev. 2000)).
36. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASS-
IFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 8 (Luckasson et al. eds., 10th ed. 2002).
[Vol. 41:811
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Both the AAMR and the APA definitions identify three prongs
of mental retardation: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, (2) significant limitations in adaptive behavior, and
(3) onset before age eighteen. The current difference between the
most recent APA definition and the most recent AAMR definition
can be explained by the fact that the APA typically waits for and
then follows the AAMR. The APA has not published a new edition
of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders since
the AAMR revised its definition of mental retardation in 2002."7
A state would be on firm ground if it adopted either the AAMR
or the APA definition of mental retardation, or if it combined the
two."8 Today, there is very little controversy about the concept
and definition of mental retardation. Although adaptive behavior
was not added by the AAMR until 1959,' 9 it is now a well-
accepted feature of the definition. Most of the disagreement
among professionals relates not to the criteria or components of
mental retardation, but rather to their measurement.4"
The drafters of the Virginia statute chose to use the AAMR
definition as their model primarily because the AAMR is the
principal professional organization in the field of mental retarda-
tion. Its definition is highly respected and also reflects the most
current research in the field. 4" The Virginia statute provides:
"Mentally retarded" means a disability, originating before the age of
18 years, characterized concurrently by (i) significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning as demonstrated by performance on a stan-
dardized measure of intellectual functioning administered in con-
formity with accepted professional practice, that is at least two stan-
dard deviations below the mean and (ii) significant limitations in
adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social and practical
adaptive skills. 
42
37. Working groups are now just being formed for the drafting of DSM V. Estimated
date of completion is 2011. Personal communication from Paul S. Appelbaum (Mar. 1,
2007).
38. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders
and Excluding Them From Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 99-101 (2003); Bonnie, supra note
30, at 305.
39. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 38.
40. Tobolowsky, supra note 38, at 101.
41. Tobolowsky urges states generally to opt for the AAMR definition. Id. at 100-01.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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The Virginia definition thus includes the three essential com-
ponents of mental retardation43 and also emphasizes the impor-
tance of adhering to professional standards of diagnosis," a fea-
ture that will be discussed in some depth later in the paper.
Recognizing that the constitutional exemption from the death
penalty, embraced in Atkins, is defined in clinical terms, the
question arises whether it might be defined more narrowly for
death penalty purposes than the standard clinical definitions
adopted by the AAMR and the APA. For example, the overall
category of mental retardation has historically been sub-classified
as mild, moderate, severe, or profound based on the IQ range in
which an individual falls.4" Individuals with an IQ between fifty
and seventy are typically considered to be "mildly retarded."46
While appearing to concede that the Eighth Amendment bars
execution of individuals with moderate, severe and profound
mental retardation, Justice Scalia objected, in his dissent in At-
kins, to the majority's decision to extend this protection to offend-
ers with mild mental retardation.47 He insisted that people with
43. Like almost every other statute barring the death penalty for people with mental
retardation, the Virginia statute includes the component of developmental origin. Id.
Manifestation of symptoms in childhood is a cardinal feature of the diagnosis; a person
whose development into adulthood was normal does not become mentally retarded, as that
term is used clinically, if he subsequently experiences the deterioration of cognitive func-
tion characteristic of Alzheimer's Disease, for example. However, one can reasonably ask
whether the legal principle enunciated in Atkins should also be applicable to people who,
as adults, acquire deficits in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior that are
equivalent in severity to those experienced by people who are mentally retarded. The two
adult-onset conditions that might involve equivalent deficits are traumatic brain injuries
and dementia. It has been argued that failure to apply the Atkins principle to such people
is unfair and irrational if the deficits they experience are equivalent in severity to those
experienced by people with mental retardation simply because those deficits developed
earlier in life-as long as they were present before the offense was committed. This view
has been embraced in identical position statements adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion, the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association.
See 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006).
New Mexico appears be the only state that has omitted the developmental origin
component from its statutory definition of mental retardation. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-
20A-2.1 (LexisNexis 2000). The Kansas proposal mentioned earlier, H.B. 2396, would omit
the requirement of developmental onset by defining cognitive disability (the condition
making a person ineligible for the death penalty) as "a disability characterized by signifi-
cant limitations both in intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior as ex-
pressed in conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills." H.B. 2396, 2007 Sess. (Kan.).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-2643:1.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
45. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36 at 7, 102.
46. Id. at 102.
47. Part II of Scalia's dissent is devoted to arguing why the execution of specifically
mildly mentally retarded offenders is not unconstitutional. By crafting his argument in
[Vol. 41:811
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mild mental retardation have a significant range of abilities and
that juries can assess the culpability of such individuals on a
case-by-case basis. 8
It is clear that the Court's majority rejected Justice Scalia's
view and meant to embrace the generally accepted clinical defini-
tion of mental retardation, including mild retardation; indeed,
Atkins himself would be classified as mildly retarded, if he is
mentally retarded at all. 9 Significantly, the Court did not qualify
or limit the term mental retardation when it observed that "death
is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal,"
and that "execution of mentally retarded criminals" is unconstitu-
tionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. ° All people
with mental retardation, whether mild or profound, are ineligible
for the death penalty under Atkins.51 Limiting the exemption to
people with profound, severe, or moderate mental retardation is
analogous to requiring proof of deficiencies in capacities (such as
moral understanding or impulse control) in addition to the defi-
ciencies in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior that are
embodied in the AAMR and APA definitions and is constitution-
ally impermissible for the same reason.52
this way, Scalia implies that perhaps the execution of severely mentally retarded indi-
viduals is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 339-40
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 349-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 308 (noting that Atkins had been evaluated by a forensic psychologist who
concluded he was "mildly mentally retarded.").
50. Id. at 321.
51. Id.
52. Although the Crime Commission embraced the AAMR definition, VA. STATE
CRIME COMM'N, Atkins v. Virginia, A STUDY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA (Jan.
2003), a competing bill, S.B. 1239, included a definition based on the DSM IV language
and supplemented that language with a diminished capacity prong; the bill would have
defined mental retardation as follows:
"Mentally retarded" means a disability, documented before the age of 18
years, characterized concurrently by (i) significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning as demonstrated by a full scale intelligence quotient (IQ) on a
standardized measure of intellectual functioning carried out in conformity
with accepted professional practice, that is more than 2 standard deviations
below the mean; (ii) significant limitations in adaptive functioning indicated
by a significant inability to perform in at least 2 of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health and safety; and (iii) a diminished capacity to understand and process
information, communicate, abstract from mistakes and learn from experience,
engage in logical reasoning, control impulses and understand the reaction of
others.
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One final question to be addressed by state legislatures in de-
fining mental retardation is whether they should limit the defini-
tion exclusively to intellectual deficits, excluding the requirement
of deficits in adaptive behavior. In effect, states adopting this ap-
proach would be barring the death penalty in more cases than
Atkins requires. Although no state has omitted the adaptive be-
havior element of the definition as far as we know, a good argu-
ment can be made for taking this course. As will be discussed be-
low, the measures for adaptive behavior are not as well developed
as those for intellectual ability, and assessments are more chal-
lenging and less reliable, and therefore entail a greater risk of er-
ror (in either direction). In defining mental retardation and in
prescribing policies to guide assessment and adjudication, state
legislatures and courts must decide whether to err in the direc-
tion of an erroneous finding that a mentally retarded defendant is
not mentally retarded, or vice versa. Focusing the assessment
and adjudication exclusively on whether the defendant exhibits
substantial intellectual deficits will remove a significant risk of
mistake in Atkins adjudications that could lead to executions of
defendants with mental retardation. On the other hand, as prose-
cutors often point out, the adaptive behavior requirement helps to
differentiate people who are significantly impaired in their ability
to function in social settings or in everyday life, from people who
are savvy enough to carry out criminal activities, notwithstand-
ing their significant intellectual deficits. When seen from this
perspective, omitting deficits in adaptive behavior from the defi-
nition unduly broadens the reach of the Atkins exemption and
compromises the retributive function of the death penalty.
S.B. 1239, 2003 Sess. (Va.) (emphasis added).
Although more subtle than the Kansas formulation of diminished capacity, this pro-
posal suffers from the same constitutional flaw: by adding additional criteria to the ac-
cepted clinical definition of mental retardation, it would permit execution of some defen-
dants who are mentally retarded.
The Senate Committee for Courts of Justice rejected this approach in favor of the
Crime Commission's proposal. S. COMM. FOR COURTS OF JUSTICE, AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE, S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003). However, the
House Committee for Courts of Justice embraced the Kansas diminished capacity ap-
proach that had been specifically rejected by the Crime Commission. H. COMM. FOR
COURTS OF JUSTICE, AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE, S. 1239, 2003 Gen. As-
sem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003). Those two bills were then approved by the Senate and House
respectively. JOINT CONF. COMM. S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003). The
Crime Commission's diagnostic approach based on the AAMR prevailed in the conference
committee, although the Crime Commission's definition of adaptive behavior was modified
in several respects and is discussed in Part IV below.
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II. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING
Intellectual functioning, typically measured by standardized
tests of IQ, has traditionally been at the core of diagnosing men-
tal retardation. Under the 2002 AAMR definition of mental re-
tardation, embraced by the Virginia statute, mental retardation
requires significant limitations in intellectual functioning "as
demonstrated by performance on a standardized measure of intel-
lectual functioning.., that is at least two standard deviations be-
low the mean."53 The Virginia statute further provides:
Assessment of intellectual functioning shall include administration
of at least one standardized measure generally accepted by the field
of psychological testing and appropriate for administration to the
particular defendant being assessed, taking into account cultural,
linguistic, sensory, motor, behavioral and other individual factors.
Testing of intellectual functioning shall be carried out in conformity
with accepted professional practice, and whenever indicated, the as-
sessment shall include information from multiple sources. The
Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance
Abuse Services shall maintain an exclusive list of standardized
measures of intellectual functioning generally accepted by the field
of psychological testing.
54
Courts must pay close attention to which IQ test was adminis-
tered to a particular defendant and to how the scores are inter-
preted. The diagnosis of mental retardation always involves sig-
nificant clinical judgment, and thus, the Virginia statute correctly
emphasizes conformity with standards of practice generally ac-
cepted by the field. The IQ test chosen to be administered must be
a "standardized measure generally accepted by the field of psy-
chological testing," and the testing process must be "carried out in
conformity with accepted professional practice."5 These require-
ments should ensure fair assessments of defendants and reliable
results that courts can use with confidence.
By embracing a clinical definition of mental retardation, the
United States Supreme Court put professional standards of meas-
urement, assessment, and diagnosis at the center of Atkins adju-
dications. Fair implementation of Atkins requires states to take
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004); AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 8.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
55. Id.
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appropriate steps to ensure that these assessments are held to
high standards of quality. States should go to great lengths at all
levels-in statutory provisions, administrative guidelines, and in
the training of judges, experts, and other court personnel-to en-
sure that capital defendants are evaluated fairly and accurately.
In this Part, guidance is offered in relation to the selection of IQ
tests, the interpretation of IQ scores, and the advisability of pre-
scribing a cut-off score in the definition of mental retardation.
A. IQ Tests
A wide range of standardized IQ tests have been developed
over the years, many of which are now considered generally ac-
cepted within the field of psychological testing. The Wechsler
scales for children and adults and the Stanford-Binet scale are
the most commonly administered and most highly respected
measures of IQ.56 Administration of either the Stanford-Binet or
the Wechsler scale is appropriate for most individuals, unless
they have particular characteristics such as language impairment
that would influence performance on these tests. Other IQ tests
have been designed to suit a variety of specific patient character-
istics, including age, race and cultural background, limited verbal
ability, and profound cognitive impairment.
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale is also in its third revi-
sion (WAIS-III). Like the WISC-III, it is designed to assess intel-
ligence as a global, multi-faceted construct. It contains verbal and
perceptual-motor subtests and yields a verbal score, a perform-
ance score, and a full-scale score.57 The WAIS-III can be used for
individuals aged sixteen to eighty-nine years.5" The WAIS-III has
a mean score of 100, with a standard deviation of 15."
56. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 59.
57. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 61.
58. Id.; MARY BEIRNE-SMITH, RICHARD F. ITTENBACH & JAMES R. PATTON, MENTAL
RETARDATION 90 (6th ed. 2002) (1998). The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for children is cur-
rently in its fourth revision (WISC-IV). It is designed to test the intelligence of children
between the ages of six years and sixteen years, eleven months. The instrument assesses
the ability of an individual to act purposefully, think rationally, and deal effectively with
his or her environment. Id. at 89. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), there is no longer any need to assess mental retarda-
tion in defendants younger than 18 in the context of a capital case.
59. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 61.
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The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale is in its fifth revision
(SB5). It tests verbal reasoning, quantitative reasoning, and
short-term memory, which together comprise intelligence as a
general concept. The instrument is designed for children aged two
years through adults.6" Like the WAIS-III, the SB5 has a mean
score of 100.61
In addition to the Wechsler and Stanford-Binet scales, other
general measures of IQ, such as the Cognitive Assessment Sys-
tem and the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test, are
suitable for administration to most individuals. For individuals
with special characteristics, tests tailored to those characteristics
should be used.
Selection of a measure of IQ that is appropriate for a particular
defendant is crucial in death penalty cases. As required by the
Virginia statute, a defendant should always be administered at
least one standardized measure of IQ,62 meaning that the test has
been normed on a representative sample of the population. The
standardized measure must also be generally accepted as accu-
rate and reliable within the field of psychological testing.63 The
Wechsler, the Stanford-Binet, and the Kaufman Adult and Ado-
lescent Intelligence Test, among others, fit both criteria for the
typical defendant. However, statutes and courts should require
IQ tests to be selected with due consideration of all the pertinent
individual characteristics of the defendant.64 Once a standardized
measure generally accepted by the field has been selected, it must
be administered in conformity with accepted professional prac-
tice.65 This typically includes administering the entire measure
rather than just parts of it, and avoiding of repeat administra-
tions of the same measure within a short period of time.
State statutes should not require the use of any specific meas-
ure for the assessment of intellectual functioning of defendants in
death penalty cases. Mandating the administration of one par-
ticular IQ test in all cases may be appealing to legislatures wish-
60. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 62; BEIRNE-SMITH ET AL.,
supra note 58, at 86-87.
61. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 62.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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ing to promote efficiency and consistency in assessment and ad-
judication of mental retardation. Requiring a single test might
also seem to promote equal application of the Atkins exemption
by facilitating judicial familiarity with the required test. How-
ever, the benefits of uniformity are greatly outweighed by its dis-
advantages.
First, and most important, IQ tests must be appropriate for the
particular individual being assessed in order for the tests to pro-
vide an accurate measure of IQ. Clinicians are expected to con-
sider cultural, linguistic, sensory, motor, and behavioral factors
in deciding which test to use and in administering and interpret-
ing it. 66 Examiners should also choose a test normed on a sample
containing individuals with characteristics similar to those pos-
sessed by the defendant.67 Different measures will be better
suited to different defendants, and a statutory requirement re-
garding test selection would unduly interfere with the exercise of
clinical judgment.
Second, in instances when one of the standard tests like the
Wechsler or Stanford-Binet would be appropriate, clinicians
should be allowed to administer the IQ test with which they per-
sonally are most experienced. When clinicians use the test with
which they are most familiar, the results are likely to be most ac-
curate. 68
Third, it would be impractical to specify the use of one measure
in all cases because IQ tests change significantly over time in re-
sponse to scientific developments and clinical research, rendering
older versions of the tests outdated. The speed of change in IQ
tests does not seem to be decelerating. The Stanford-Binet scale
was first published in 1905, and it was revised in 1916, 1937,
1960, 1972, 1986, and 2003.69 The first Wechsler scale was pub-
lished in 1939, and was revised in 1955, 1981, and 1997. 70 Be-
cause future revisions of common IQ tests can be expected, state
66. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 35, at 42; AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RE-
TARDATION, supra note 36, at 8; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
67. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 35, at 46.
68. See id. at 42.
69. GALE H. Rom & R. ANDREW BARRAM, ESSENTIALS OF STANFORD-BINET INTEL-
LIGENCE SCALES (SB5) ASSESSMENT 3-9 (2004).
70. David S. Tulsky et al., Revising a Standard: An Evaluation of the Origin and De-
velopment of the WAIS-III, in CLINICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WAIS-III AND WMS-III
43, 43 (David S. Tulsky et al. eds., 2003).
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legislatures should allow sufficient flexibility for practice in fo-
rensic settings to keep pace with scientific and clinical advances
in the field.
Consistent with this analysis, the post-Atkins legislation in
Virginia emphasizes the need for clinical discretion in selecting
the appropriate test for a particular defendant, while requiring
use of at least one "standardized measure generally accepted by
the field of psychological testing."71 The Code language pertaining
to assessment of intellectual functioning quoted above is virtually
identical to the language recommended by the Clinical Advisory
Group,72 except for the last sentence requiring the state to main-
tain an "exclusive list" of accepted measures of intellectual func-
tioning for use in the context of Atkins evaluations.73 Adoption of
such a requirement by other states is strongly discouraged. Be-
cause the "exclusive list" requirement was subject to ongoing dis-
pute during legislative consideration of the bill, further discus-
sion is warranted.
As originally drafted by the Clinical Advisory Group and pro-
posed to the Atkins Subcommittee, the bill did not include the last
sentence.74 However, prosecutors were concerned that the re-
quirement that experts use "at least one standardized measure
generally accepted by the field" and that testing be "carried out in
conformity with accepted professional practice" did not ade-
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
72. Draft Bill, Nov. 8, 2002: Atkins v. Virginia Materials, The Papers of Richard J.
Bonnie (unpublished bill, on file with the University of Virginia Law Library, Special Col-
lections, Box 1, Mss 81-9p). As proposed by the CAG in its report on October 17, 2002, the
bill provided:
Assessment of intellectual functioning must include administration of at least
one standardized measure generally accepted by the field and appropriate for
administration to the particular person being assessed, taking into account
cultural, linguistic, sensory motor, behavioral and other individual factors.
Testing of intellectual functioning should be carried out in conformity with
accepted professional practice, and, whenever indicated, the assessment
should include information from multiple sources.
CLINICAL ADVISORY GROUP, REPORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEATH PENALTY AND
DEFENDANTS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, Oct. 17, 2002: Atkins v. Virginia Materials, The
Papers of Richard J. Bonnie (unpublished report, on file with the University of Virginia
Law Library, Special Collections, Box 1, Mss 81-9p) [hereinafter CAG REPORT, Oct. 17,
2002]. The single change in this language was to specify that the relevant "field" of profes-
sional practice is "psychological testing." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol.
2004).
73. Id.
74. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004); CAG REPORT, Oct. 17,
2002, supra note 72.
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
quately narrow the types of tests that can be used and would al-
low experts retained by defendants to administer idiosyncratic
tests purposely selected to produce low scores. The Atkins Sub-
Committee shared the concern raised by prosecutors and con-
cluded that the Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retarda-
tion and Substance Abuse Services should be directed to keep a
list of qualifying instruments.
The key point of disagreement that emerged in the subcommit-
tee deliberations and persisted all the way through the legislative
process was whether the list of generally accepted tests should
serve solely as a resource for experts conducting Atkins evalua-
tions, as proposed by the CAG representatives,7 5 or whether it
should have prescriptive force, as urged by the prosecutors. This
disagreement was captured in the question of whether the list
should be a non-exclusive list or an exclusive one. The CAG rep-
resentatives attempted to dissuade the Subcommittee and the
Crime Commission from requiring the list to be exclusive, argu-
ing that a prescriptive approach was not needed and that it would
likely cause more problems than it would solve.
First, the CAG representatives insisted that the language re-
quiring the use of standardized tests "generally accepted by the
field," as well as "conformity with accepted professional practice,"
provided adequate safeguards against idiosyncratic selection of
homemade, unproven, or unsuitable tests, particularly if a re-
source list of such tests is maintained by the Commissioner.
Moreover, expert testimony as to what constitutes accepted pro-
fessional practice can be expected to discredit testing and opinion
by outliers.
Second, it was argued that conferring authority on a govern-
ment official to prescribe how mental health professionals should
carry out clinical testing would be institutionally inappropriate. If
the list maintained by the Commissioner is given prescriptive ef-
fect, it implies that an opinion based on an unlisted test would be
inadmissible. Such a regulatory requirement implies that the
Commissioner should adhere to legal norms governing adminis-
trative rule-making. Criteria for determining whether a measure
75. The phrase "CAG representatives" refers to the Chair of the CAG (the first author)
and other members of the CAG who were consulted on the drafting of the bill on an on-
going basis, whether or not they were actually present at the meetings of the Atkins Sub-
committee or the Crime Commission.
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should be on the list would have to be developed. Guidelines
would also have to be established stating when the list would be
updated and at what point in time an instrument must be on the
list for it to qualify. A brand new, validated measure of intelli-
gence might have to be disqualified simply because it does not
appear on the state's list.
It is highly unusual for the government to prescribe which of a
variety of acceptable psychometric measures should be used in
conducting a clinical evaluation, including a forensic assess-
ment.76 Professional organizations like the AAMR, as well as
peer-reviewed professional literature, can and should be relied
upon to guide clinicians in exercising their professional judgment.
It is also institutionally awkward for the legislative branch to di-
rect the executive branch to keep a list of measures designed to
displace judicial judgment as to what evidence should be admis-
sible as expert opinion bearing on proof of whether a defendant is
mentally retarded-a constitutionally required finding.
During the course of deliberations by the Atkins Subcommittee
and the Crime Commission, CAG representatives successfully
warded off language that would give the Commissioner's list of
generally accepted measures prescriptive effect. The November
22, 2002 draft of the Crime Commission's bill included the lan-
guage that "[t]he Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retar-
dation and Substance Abuse Services shall maintain a list of
standardized measures of intellectual functioning generally ac-
cepted by the field."77 The January 8, 2003 draft required the
Commissioner to maintain a "nonexclusive list."" This was the
76. CAG REPORT, Oct 17, 2002, supra note 72, at 2. To our knowledge, the only context
in which the Commonwealth of Virginia has directed use of a particular scientific instru-
ment is the screening of "prisoners incarcerated for sexually violent offenses ... who are
scheduled for release from prison within 10 months" where the Director of the Department
of Corrections is directed identify those prisoners "who receive a score of five or more on
the Static-99 or a like score on a comparable, scientifically validated instrument desig-
nated by the Commissioner," VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-903(C) (Supp. 2006). Even in this con-
text, though, use of "comparable, scientifically validated instruments" is permitted.
77. Draft Bill, Nov. 22, 2002: Atkins v. Virginia Materials, The Papers of Richard J.
Bonnie (unpublished bill, on file with the University of Virginia Law Library, Special Col-
lections, Box 1, Mss 81-9p).
78. Draft Bill, Jan. 8, 2003: Atkins v. Virginia Materials, The Papers of Richard J.
Bonnie (unpublished bill, on file with the University of Virginia Law Library, Special Col-
lections, Box 1, Mss 81-9p).
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phrase that was included in the Crime Commission bills intro-
duced in the General Assembly. 79
In February 2003, the House of Delegates amended the Crime
Commission bill to require an "exclusive list" of acceptable meas-
ures of intellectual functioning,8 ° and that language was retained
in the bill approved by the Joint Conference Committee."1 After
consultation with the drafters of the Crime Commission bill, in-
cluding the CAG chair, the Governor recommended that "refer-
ence list" be substituted for "exclusive list."8 2 However, his sug-
gestion was not adopted by the General Assembly,83 and, after
renewed consultation with the CAG chair, the Governor signed
the bill rather than abandon what was, overall, a very good bill.
As a result, Virginia law requires the Commissioner of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services to
maintain an "exclusive list" of IQ tests "generally accepted"
within the field of clinical psychology and therefore acceptable for
use in Atkins evaluations. 8'
In light of this legislative history, it should come as no surprise
that litigants in Atkins adjudications have sparred over the sig-
nificance of the fact that a particular test is not on the Commis-
sioner's list,8 ' and have lobbied to have particular tests added to
the list. It is, of course, necessary for the list to be open to addi-
tions based on developments in the field of intelligence testing.
Until recently, the process of reviewing new tests has been an in-
formal one: the Director of the Office of Forensic Services of the
79. S.B. 1141 was transmuted into S.B. 1239 when it was approved as an amendment
in the nature of a substitute by the Senate Committee for Courts of Justice. S. 1141, 2003
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003); S. COMM. FOR COURTS OF JUSTICE, AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE, S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003).
80. H. COMM. FOR COURTS OF JUSTICE, AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE,
S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003).
81. J. CONF. COMM., AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE, S. 1239, 2003 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003).
82. See Virginia General Assembly Legislative Information System, S.B. 1239, http:l!
legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=031&typ=bil&val=sb1239 (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
83. S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
85. Personal communication from James Morris, Director of the Office of Forensic
Services, Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Ser-
vices, April 4, 2007 (discussing a case where the list was changed after the testing, and the
measure used was removed. The court retroactively applied the edited list, denying admis-
sibility of the test used, even though it was on the list at the time it was administered).
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Department has recommended changes to the list as information
about previously unlisted tests has emerged. When such an addi-
tion is made, the list has been updated.86
In light of the prescriptive effect of the Commissioner's list, the
process of reviewing proposed additions (or deletions) should be
formalized, whether or not a more formal process is required by
the Administrative Process Act. 7 The list itself should be offi-
cially published and easily available on the Department's website.
The website should set forth the procedure to be used by anyone
who seeks to add a new measure or to challenge the continued
listing of measures already on the list. Measures under review at
any time, either by the Office of Forensic Services on its own ini-
tiative or on the request of someone else, should be identified on
the website. The Office of Forensic Services should appoint a
panel of experts to review all proposed changes to the list and
should identify the panel members on the website. After review,
the panel should make recommendations to the Commissioner.
The Commissioner's decisions should be specifically communi-
cated on the website.88
B. Interpretation of IQ Scores
According to the definition of mental retardation in the Vir-
ginia statute, "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning"
must be "demonstrated by performance on a standardized meas-
ure of intellectual functioning administered in conformity with
accepted professional practice, that is at least two standard de-
86. The most recent list is dated October 31, 2005. See "List of Standardized Measures
of Intellectual Functioning, www.dmhmrsas.virginia.gov/documents/OFO-standardized
measures.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
87. We do not believe that the maintenance of this list constitutes formal rule-making
within the meaning of Virginia's Administrative Process Act. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-4000-
4031 (Repl. Vol. 2005). The APA only governs agency actions concerning rules or regula-
tions which "hav[e] the force of law." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4001. Because the Commissioner
does not have generic authority to adopt regulations and § 19.2-264.3:1.1 does use the
terms "rule" or "regulation" to refer to the list, maintaining the standardized measures of
intellectual functioning is not properly characterized as promulgating a "rule or regula-
tion" that has "the force of law," and is not subject to the rule-making procedures found at
§ 2.2-4007.
88. When this article was in press, the Commissioner established such a committee.
See Memorandum from James S. Reinhard, M.D., on the subject of "Commissioner's Re-
view Panel for the selection of measures of intellectual functioning pursuant to § 19.2-
264.3:1.1 of the Virginia Code" (April 4, 2007) (on file with the authors).
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viations below the mean." 9 In addition, the statute directs that
"[t]esting of intellectual functioning shall be carried out in con-
formity with accepted professional practice."9" These two provi-
sions are perhaps the most important provisions in the statute
because they import standard practices of administering, scoring,
and interpreting IQ tests into the law. Four clinically and legally
important issues affecting the meaning of an IQ score will be ad-
dressed below: the standard error of measurement in psychologi-
cal testing; the increase in scores on standardized tests among
the general population over time, known as the Flynn effect;
practice effects; and the presence of mental illness.
For the purposes of this section regarding the interpretation of
IQ scores, we will assume that "significantly subaverage intellec-
tual functioning"91 is operationalized as a score of 70 or below on
a specific IQ test. That is often the case, given that a score of 70 is
typically two standard deviations below the mean on a test desig-
nating a score of 100 as the mean. This assumption, and the ques-
tion of whether the law should explicitly establish a cut-off IQ
score for mental retardation (as many states do), will be discussed
later in this paper.
1. Standard Error of Measurement
All measurement, both physical and psychological, has some
potential for error. For example, when someone's height is being
measured, the result will be influenced by many factors including
the particular tool being used, the eyesight of the measurer, the
care taken by the measurer, and whether the person being meas-
ured is wearing shoes or slouching. Psychological testing has even
greater potential for error because it is more subjective. Error
may be introduced by the examiner making a timing mistake,
failing to record responses, over-prompting, mishandling stimuli
objects, or neglecting to repeat parts of the instructions.92 Error
may also be introduced by the defendant's mood and general
health, luck, or other undetermined factors.93 In any kind of
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
92. ALAN S. KAUFMAN & ELIZABETH 0. LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING ADOLESCENT AND
ADULT INTELLIGENCE 197 (3d ed. 2006).
93. James R. Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ, and the Flynn Effect,
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measurement there are always tradeoffs between cost and accu-
racy.
Standard error of measurement (SEM) helps to quantify the
errors in intelligence tests in order to facilitate the most accurate
interpretation and presentation of scores.94 Both the AAMR and
the APA definitions of mental retardation stress the importance
of considering SEM when evaluating IQ scores.95 SEM varies be-
tween measures and between age groups within each measure.
Each measure is accompanied by a table of calculated SEMs by
age group. Generally, SEM is estimated to be between three and
five points for well-standardized IQ tests. This means that if a
person were retested using the same measure, there would be a
two-thirds likelihood that he would score within three or four
points above or below his previous score. 96 Consequently, an IQ of
70 is not accurately understood as a precise score, but rather as a
range of confidence with parameters of at least one SEM (mean-
ing scores between 66 and 74 would be expected 67% of the time)
or with parameters of two SEMs (meaning scores between 62 and
78 would be expected 95% of the time). 97 In order to be highly
confident that a person is not mentally retarded, therefore, an IQ
score of at least 79 might be required, whereas a score of 76 might
be required to rule out mental retardation if a somewhat lower
level of confidence ("reasonable confidence") were acceptable.
Conversely, one could be reasonably confident that a person is
mentally retarded if the person had an IQ score of 64,9' and a
score of 66 would be very strong, though not 'conclusive, evidence
of mental retardation. Any score in between these illustrative
scores (i.e., between 67 and 75) would be consistent with the exis-
tence of mental retardation.
SEM can thus either increase or decrease a defendant's score,
and this uncertainty in the direction of the effect may be compli-
cated for courts to deal with. Courts, based on a societal value
12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 170, 171 (2006); see AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, su-
pra note 36, at 57.
94. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 57-58.
95. Id. at 58 (with respect to intellectual functioning, the criterion for a diagnosis of
mental retardation is performance on an IQ test "approximately two standard deviations
below the mean, considering the SEM for the specific assessment instruments used"); AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 35, at 41-42.
96. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION supra note 36, at 57.
97. Id.
98. Flynn, supra note 93, at 186.
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
judgment, may decide to consider SEM in only one direction. If
courts consider it desirable to err on the side of finding mental re-
tardation in Atkins cases in order to avoid the risk of mistakenly
executing a defendant who actually qualified for Eighth Amend-
ment protection, perhaps they would decide only to use SEM to
decrease a score. If so, SEM could only be used to put a defendant
into the mentally retarded range but not to take a defendant out
of that range. Using the example above, a recorded score of 73
might be a score of 69 taking one SEM into account, placing the
defendant in the zone of mental retardation. However, a score of
68 might be regarded as definitive evidence of mental retardation
even though it might actually represent a score of 72 or 76 (out-
side the range of mental retardation) if one or two SEM were
taken into account.
The main point here is that the SEM must always be taken
into account when interpreting scores on IQ tests; failing to do so
would be a clear departure from accepted professional practice in
scoring and interpreting any kind of psychological test, including
IQ tests. The importance of the SEM is so well-established in the
field that it would be superfluous to direct experts to take it into
account in a statute governing Atkins evaluations and adjudica-
tions, and most state laws say nothing about it. 99 Nonetheless, in
its effort to provide as much guidance as possible to courts, the
proposal drafted by the Clinical Advisory Group explicitly stated
that SEM must be considered in Atkins cases," ° as did the initial
drafts of the bill in the Atkins subcommittee.0 1 In the course of
99. See State Statutes Prohibiting Death Penalty for People with Mental Retardation,
Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=28&
did=138 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (listing all state statues that prohibit death penalty for
people with mental retardation); State that Have Changed Their Statutes to Comply with
the Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, Death Penalty Information Center,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=28&did=668 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007)
(listing changes in state statutes since Atkins was decided by the Supreme Court).
100. See CAG REPORT, Oct. 17, 2002, supra note 72 ("Substantial limitation in intellec-
tual functioning means performance that is at least two standard deviations below the
mean, considering the standard error of measurement for the specific instruments used, as
well as their strengths and limitations in the context of the particular assessment.") This
language was drawn directly from the AAMR Manual. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 58 (with respect to intellectual functioning, the criterion
for a diagnosis of mental retardation is performance on an IQ test "approximately two
standard deviations below the mean, considering the standard error of measurement for
the specific assessment instruments used").
101. Draft Bill, Nov. 1, 2002: Atkins v. Virginia Materials, The Papers of Richard J.
Bonnie (unpublished bill, on file with the University of Virginia Law Library, Special Col-
lections, Box 1, Mss 81-9p).
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the subcommittee and Crime Commission deliberations, prosecu-
tors proposed that specific reference to SEM be omitted on the
ground that this would simplify the scientific language of the bill.
However, the CAG representatives urged the subcommittee and
the Crime Commission to retain the SEM language in order to
emphasize that any IQ score actually represents a range of possi-
ble scores. The Crime Commission proposal as passed by the Sen-
ate included the CAG's reference to the SEM in the definition of
mentally retarded:
"Mentally retarded" means a disability ... characterized . .. by (i)
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as demonstrated by
performance on a standardized measure of intellectual functioning
carried out in conformity with accepted professional practice, that is
at least 2 standard deviations below the mean, considering the stan-
dard error of measurement for the specific instruments used.... 02
However, the reference to the SEM was deleted from the ver-
sion of the Atkins bill passed by the House of Delegates' ° and
was then omitted in the bill approved by the joint conference
committee.' 4 The Crime Commission drafters decided to acqui-
esce in this amendment on the ground that the omitted language,
though desirable, was not necessary. As noted above, the re-
quirement that intellectual functioning be assessed in conformity
with accepted professional practice mandates the consideration of
the SEM. As a matter of professional practice, experts will have
to testify about why they think a particular score indicates that a
defendant's performance on a specific measure was at least two
standard deviations below the mean. Ensuring that forensic ex-
perts and lawyers sufficiently understand the importance and ef-
fects of SEM thus becomes a matter of training.
2. The Flynn Effect
Courts interpreting IQ scores must take the Flynn effect into
account if they are to reach accurate understandings of the mean-
102. S. COMM. FOR COURTS OF JUSTICE, AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE,
S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) (emphasis added).
103. See H. COMM. FOR COURTS OF JUSTICE, AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A
SUBSTITUTE, S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003); see also Draft Bill, Feb. 3,
2003: Atkins v. Virginia Materials, The Papers of Richard J. Bonnie (unpublished bill, on
file with the University of Virginia Law Library, Special Collections, Box 1, Mss 81-9p).
104. S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. 19.2-264.3:1.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ing of an individual's score. Broadly speaking, the Flynn effect is
the finding that IQ scores tend to increase in the general popula-
tion over time and thus IQ tests will yield different scores purely
based on when they were normed.' 05 The rate of increase in test
scores varies somewhat across measures, but the Wechsler and
Stanford-Binet scales have a roughly uniform rate of increase.° 6
James R. Flynn, whom first noted this effect and whose name it
carries, has found the rate of increase to be 0.3 IQ points per year
between the time the test was normed and when the test was
taken.107 In order to calculate an accurate IQ score taking the
Flynn effect into consideration, courts and clinicians must multi-
ply the number of years that have elapsed between the norming
and the administration of the measure by 0.3 and subtract that
number from the defendant's score.0' The explanation for con-
stant gains in IQ over time is unclear, but the data are highly
convincing and the 0.3 point rate of increase "holds true both at
the mean and for low IQ" scores. 109
A number of state and federal courts have considered the rele-
vance of the Flynn effect to IQ scores admitted as evidence over
the last few years."0 In Walker v. True, for example, the Fourth
Circuit held that the Flynn effect must be applied whenever a de-
fendant can show that it affected his IQ score."' Given the robust
nature of the data supporting the Flynn effect, failing to adjust
scores accordingly in capital punishment cases leaves eligibility
for the death penalty to chance, since the accuracy of the reported
score otherwise depends on how recently the IQ test that hap-
pened to be administered was normed." 2
105. Flynn, supra note 93, at 170. See also, Tomoe Kanaya, Matthew Scullin & Stephen
Ceci, The Flynn Effect and U.S. Policies: The Impact of Rising IQ Scores on American So-
ciety via Mental Retardation Diagnoses, 58 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 778, 786-87 (2003).
106. Flynn, supra note 93, at 173.
107. Id.
108. The formula to account for the Flynn effect is: IQ = Test Score - (Years x. 0.3). Id.
at 187.
109. Id. at 184. See also, Kanaya et al., supra note 105, at 779.
110. See, e.g., Moore v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 484, 499 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2006); Walton v.
Johnson, 407 F.3d 285, 296 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2005); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 322-23
(4th Cir. 2005); In re Hicks, 375 F.3d 1237, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2004); Bowling v. Com-
monwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 374 & n.12 (Ky. 2005); Myers v. State, 130 P.3d 262, 267-68
n.11 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
111. Walker, 399 F.3d at 322-23.
112. Flynn, supra note 93, at 174-75.
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3. Practice Effects
Practice effects refer to the impact on later test scores of previ-
ously administered IQ tests. '13 Practice effects nearly always in-
flate IQ scores where the subject had a previous opportunity to
practice the tasks required by the tests."' Practice effects are
strongest when there is a short time between a test and retest.115
On the WAIS-III, verbal IQ scores are expected, on average, to in-
crease by about 2.5 points for individuals between the ages of six-
teen and eighty-nine in retest situations." 6 Performance IQ
scores are to be expected, on average, to increase by 8-8.5 points
for 16-54 year-olds, by six points for 55-74 year-olds, and by four
points for 75-89 year-olds." 7 When two IQ tests must be admin-
istered within a short timeframe, practice effects can be avoided
by administering a different test the second time. A common rule
of thumb is to avoid using the same test twice within one year."'
Six months is probably sufficient, but there appears to be no re-
search identifying the point at which short-term practice effects
dissipate.
The need to take practice effects into account is complicated by
several factors." 9 First, the above-referenced figures are just av-
erages, and are usually based on the original test norms and data
collected by the test publisher. Obviously, there are important in-
dividual variations. Some subjects gain more than others, and
some subtests are more amenable to learning than others. For
example, once the object assembly puzzles are solved, they are
more easily solved the next time the test is administered. Particu-
lar trouble with this subtest would result in an above-average
practice effect.
Practice effects vary according to the person's age, their learn-
ing ability and the time interval between testing. For subjects
with significant intellectual deficits, such as mental retardation,
113. See KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, supra note 92, at 202.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 207-08.
116. Id. at 209.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. The observations on practice effects in the next few paragraphs are based on per-
sonal e-mail correspondence from Dewey Cornell, Ph.D., Clinical Psychologist, Curry
School of Education, University of Virginia (March 6, 2007) (on file with author).
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short term practice effects are likely to be smaller than for per-
sons with greater learning ability. However, there appears to be
little research demonstrating this effect. 120 Clinically, adults who
have been in mental retardation educational programs for many
years will have been tested numerous times. It is common that
such persons show an overall increase in IQ (sometimes now scor-
ing above 70), despite continuing deficits in social intelligence and
adaptive behavior. In these cases, there may be an accumulated
practice effect which suggests-based on scores alone-that the
adult is no longer mentally retarded.
It should also be emphasized that motivation may vary among
subjects and across settings. People with mental retardation are
often reluctant to engage and put forth their best effort in testing
because of frustration, and as a result, their ability may be un-
derestimated.12 1 A skilled examiner who establishes rapport with
the subject can obtain markedly higher scores which might be
misconstrued as "practice effects" or even gains in intelligence.
Practice effects are likely to be a particular problem in the con-
text of the criminal justice system. The contested nature of Atkins
adjudications means that both prosecutors and defendants are
likely to retain their own experts. Each expert is likely in turn to
want to administer his own IQ test. In the post-Atkins assess-
ments of Daryl Atkins, the defense expert administered the
WAIS-III, and the government's expert, Dr. Stanton Samenow,
administered the same test two days later.'22  On cross-
examination, Dr. Samenow testified that he knew the WAIS-III
had been administered two days prior and that ordinarily it
would not be accepted professional practice to readminister the
same test because of the resulting practice effects.' 23 However,
Dr. Samenow testified that he decided to readminister the WAIS-
III because it was the only IQ test he had brought to the prison.124
The court held that, while it did not affect the admissibility of the
expert's opinion, readministering the test was highly relevant to
the weight to be accorded to that opinion.'2
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 631 S.E.2d 93, 96 (Va. 2006).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 96 n.4.
125. Id. at 96 & n.6.
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4. Mental Illness
Mental illness, as well as general mood and physical health,
adds a situational component to performance on measures of
IQ. 126 However, since mental retardation is an enduring condi-
tion, courts should be aware that whether a defendant performed
in the mentally retarded range at the time of the IQ test does not
necessarily demonstrate that he is mentally retarded. Rather, it
is important to have an IQ score that is representative of the de-
fendant's typical intellectual functioning. If a defendant is af-
fected by acute symptoms of mental illness at the time of an IQ
test, it is well known that his cognitive functioning may be de-
pressed.'27 This would result in a low IQ score and perhaps, a di-
agnosis of mental retardation although the defendant is not in
fact mentally retarded. In an ironic reversal of the usual roles,
well-informed prosecutors may therefore want to rely upon the
defendant's mental illness (at the time of testing) in support of
the argument that the defendant's actual IQ is higher than sug-
gested by scores on tests administered during acute exacerbations
of mental illness. Courts should be aware of this problem and re-
gard scores obtained when a defendant was affected by acute
symptoms of mental illness with skepticism.
5. Substandard Normative Sample for the WAIS-III
All IQ scores from the WAIS-III require some adjustment be-
cause the normative sample was substandard and thus unrepre-
sentative of the population as a whole. 12 Scores on the WAIS-III
were inflated by 2.34 points even at the time it was normed and
thus courts and clinicians should deduct 2.34 points from all
WAIS-III scores. 1
29
C. Cut-Off Scores
For purposes of the preceding discussion of the role of standard
error of measurement, the Flynn effect, and other factors affect-
126. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 182.
127. Thomas Grisso and Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study, III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 J.
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 149, 154, 159 (1995).
128. See Flynn, supra note 93, at 178.
129. See id.
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ing the interpretation of IQ scores, we have assumed that "sig-
nificantly subaverage intellectual functioning" is operationalized
as scoring 70 or below on a specific IQ test. While this is a useful
assumption to make when explaining the effects of factors like
standard error of measurement, a score of 70 or below (or any
other specific cut-off score) should not be embraced by courts or
state legislatures as a part of the definition of mental retarda-
tion. 130 Instead, a significant limitation in intellectual functioning
should be defined as performance that is at least two standard
deviations below the mean, as both the AAMR and the APA rec-
ommended, 131 and the Virginia statute provides. 132
The standard deviation measures the variation of scores in
comparison to the mean score of the population on which the test
has been normed. Two-thirds of the population will have scores
falling within one standard deviation on either side of the mean,
and 95 percent of the population will have scores falling within
two standard deviations on either side of the mean. The WAIS-III
and the SB5 both have a mean score of 100 and a standard devia-
tion of 15.133 Two-thirds of the population will thus have a score
between 85 and 115 (one standard deviation) and 95 percent of
the population will have a score between 70 and 130 (two stan-
dard deviations). 134 Consequently, an IQ score of 70 is sometimes
used as a proxy for a score two standard deviations below the
mean, but the score of 70 should not be reified.
130. See Ellis, supra note 26, at 13; Richard J. Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation's Resource Document on Mental Retardation and Capital Sentencing: Implementing
Atkins v. Virginia, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 304, 305-06 (2004); Kay B. Stevens &
J. Randall Price, Adaptive Behavior, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty, 6 J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1, 21 (2006). Unfortunately, at least thirteen states use a spe-
cific score as a cut-off, typically 70, although Arkansas specifies 65 and Illinois specifies
75. See State Statutes Prohibiting Death Penalty for People with Mental Retardation,
Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article/php?scid=28&
did=138 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007); States that Have Changed Their Statutes to Comply
With the Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, Death Penalty Information Cen-
ter, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=28&did+668 (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
131. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 13; AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, supra note 35, at 41-42 (specifying approximately 70 as a cut-off score, but making
clear that 70 is intended to be an approximation of a score two standard deviations below
the mean); see also Bonnie, supra note 130, at 305-06.
132. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
133. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 61; ROID & BARRAM,
supra note 69, at 3.
134. See AM. AS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 61; ROID & BARRAM,
supra note 69, at 3.
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Standard deviations should be used in the definition and diag-
nosis of mental retardation instead of cut-off scores for a number
of reasons. First, different IQ tests use different scoring norms,
meaning that the mean score does not necessarily have to be set
at 100. Setting a cut-off score of 70 in the definition would there-
fore be nonsensical since 70 means different things on different
tests, unless the law also directed evaluators to use a particular
test normed with a mean of 70. As previously discussed, however,
it would be unwise to mandate the use of one particular measure
because it may not be well suited to all defendants and examin-
ers.
Second, different IQ tests may have different standard devia-
tions. For example, the fourth revision of the Stanford-Binet scale
(SB4) had a standard deviation of 16.135 The diagnosis of mental
retardation refers to intellectual functioning that is in a low per-
centile compared to the rest of the population, not to the fact that
a person scored less than a certain number on an IQ test. The
score has no inherent meaning; it refers to the subject's perform-
ance in comparison to the relevant population. A person who
scored 70 on the SB4 would not have performed in the bottom 2.5
percent of the population (the percentage of the population that
falls more than two standard deviations below the mean) because
only a score of 68 was two standard deviations below the mean on
that test.
Third, a fixed cut-off score would ignore the fact that different
IQ tests have different standard errors of measurement (SEM).136
Given the inevitable presence of some measurement error, each
IQ score should actually be viewed as a range of possible scores.
Like differences in standard deviations, differences in SEM be-
tween measures suggest that a score of 70 does not necessarily
mean the same thing on different instruments.
Fourth, IQ tests are generally most accurate with respect to
people who fall within two standard deviations of the mean. Since
people with mental retardation by definition fall outside this
group, their scores are somewhat less trustworthy than those
135. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 62.
136. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 58; Brian R. Bryant,
Intelligence Testing, in ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 13, 13
(Ronald L. Taylor ed., 1997).
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closer to the mean.'37 Although this decrease in confidence as IQ
scores approach high or low extremes certainly does not discredit
the validity of extreme scores, it does highlight the importance of
viewing the diagnosis of mental retardation as involving clinical
judgment and evaluation of all three diagnostic criteria (intellec-
tual functioning, adaptive behavior, and age of onset). Establish-
ing a fixed cut-off score would ignore the role of clinical judgment
in the diagnosis of mental retardation.
In sum, a cut-off score for intellectual functioning would only
be plausible if it were defined as 70 or below on a specific test
with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15 and if it incor-
porated some way of taking individualized factors such as the
Flynn effect and practice effects into account. This is not an ad-
visable approach. Not only should clinicians have freedom to se-
lect the IQ test that in their judgment is most appropriate for the
defendant being examined, it would be very cumbersome to de-
velop a standard protocol for incorporating important individual-
ized factors "into" the cut-off score.
In addition to these scientific objections to using a cut-off score,
such scores are also objectionable on legal grounds. Focusing on a
"number" implies that the diagnosis of mental retardation is more
mechanical and more objective than it really is, and tends to ob-
scure the inevitable clinical factors that affect performance on
standardized cognitive measures. These clinical factors must be
taken into account in judging whether a particular person exhib-
its "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning," meriting a
diagnosis of mental retardation. Ultimately, in cases on the mar-
gin, experts need to exercise their own judgment, as do judges
and juries. De-emphasizing a cut-off score is another way of high-
lighting the challenge of deciding each Atkins adjudication on its
own merits. Courts and juries can hear testimony from experts on
both sides to determine what a particular IQ score actually
means. Then, the court should determine for themselves whether
a defendant has the requisite intellectual deficits and whether he
is mentally retarded when all three components of mental retar-
dation are considered.
In Johnson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia incor-
rectly observed that the statutory requirement that a defendant's
137. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 56.
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IQ score fall at least two standard deviations below the mean is
interchangeable with scoring 70 or less on an IQ test. 138 The court
stated that the defendant's "scores of 75 and 78 on these I.Q. tests
exceed the score of 70 that the General Assembly has chosen as
the threshold score below which one may be classified as being
mentally retarded." 139 The General Assembly did not establish 70
as a threshold score.140 It referred to a score that is at least two
standard deviations below the mean as a threshold score.14 ' As
we have explained above, this is not a trivial distinction.
III. ASSESSMENT OF ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR
A. The Definition and Measurement of Adaptive Behavior
In addition to having substantial limitations in intellectual
functioning, an individual must have significant limitations in
adaptive behavior in order to be diagnosed as mentally re-
tarded. '42 Adaptive behavior is included in all major classification
systems and there is a professional consensus that it is an essen-
tial component of mental retardation. ' Adaptive behavior refers
to how effectively an individual can meet the demands of daily
life and to what extent an individual can live independently, in
comparison to what would be expected of his age group, sociocul-
tural background, and community.' For the purposes of meas-
urement, adaptive behavior is a combination of conceptual, social,
and practical skills that people learn in order to function in eve-
ryday life.'45 Conceptual skills include cognitive abilities, com-
munication, and academic skills such as language, the use of
138. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 47, 59 (Va. 2004).
139. Id.
140. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
141. Id.
142. Id.; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 35, at 41; AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 8.
143. Robert L. Schalock, Introduction to ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENTS
2 (Robert L. Schalock ed., 1999).
144. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 35, at 42; JAMES R. THOMPSON ET AL., Adap-
tive and Maladaptive Behavior: Functional and Structural Characteristics, in ADAPTIVE
BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENTS 15, 16 (Robert L. Schalock ed., 1999).
145. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 14; see also VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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money, and self-direction. 146 Social skills include interpersonal re-
lationships, self-esteem, lack of gullibility, and the ability to fol-
low rules. 147 Practical skills are independent living skills such as
toileting, eating, housekeeping, transportation, and occupational
skills. 148 Limitations in adaptive behavior may result from not
knowing how to perform a skill (acquisition deficit) or not know-
ing when to use a learned skill (performance deficit).'49 Either
type of deficit can contribute to mental retardation.' Adaptive
behavioral strengths are likely to coexist with weaknesses. Mal-
adaptive or problem behavior is not considered a limitation in
adaptive behavior itself, but it may affect the performance or ac-
quisition of adaptive behavioral skills.'
Adaptive behavior was added to the AAMR definition in 1959
in order to reflect the social characteristics of mental retardation,
to reduce reliance on IQ scores in diagnoses and incorporate evi-
dence of functioning in the real world, and to decrease the num-
ber of people falsely identified as having mental retardation.'52
Although the importance of adaptive behavior is universally rec-
ognized, scientific understanding of adaptive behavior and its
measurement is still in its infancy, especially in comparison to
the conceptualization and measurement of intelligence. Notwith-
standing general agreement that limitations in adaptive behavior
should be part of the definition of mental retardation, researchers
continue to investigate its structure and the best methods to as-
sess it.' 53 The lack of clarity in the construct of adaptive behavior
is evidenced by the fact that while over 200 measures of adaptive
behavior have been created, they differ markedly from one an-
other.5 4 This calls into question the validity of the measures-
i.e., whether the tests actually measure what scientists intend
them to measure and whether useful inferences regarding the di-
146. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 42.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 42.
149. Id. at 73-74.
150. Id. at 74.
151. Id. at 75.
152. Id. at 24; Stephen Greenspan, A Contextualist Perspective on Adaptive Behavior,
in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENTS 61, 61 (Robert L. Schalock ed., 1999).
153. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 24; Schalock, supra
note 143, at 2; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 144, at 16; Stevens & Price, supra note 130,
at 5.
154. Scott Spreat, Psychometric Standards for Adaptive Behavior Assessment, in
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENTS 103, 103 (Robert L. Schalock ed., 1999).
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agnosis of mental retardation can be drawn from the subjects'
performance on these tests.155
The concept of adaptive behavior is far more important to di-
agnoses of mild mental retardation than to diagnoses of moder-
ate, severe, or profound mental retardation. A diagnosis of mod-
erate to profound mental retardation will rarely turn on
standardized measurement of adaptive behavior because signifi-
cant limitations will be so clearly apparent in those individu-
als. 15 Precise and accurate assessment of adaptive behavior,
however, is crucial for diagnoses of mild mental retardation be-
cause in borderline cases it may well tip the scales either towards
or away from a diagnosis. 157
Instruments for assessing adaptive behavior typically involve
interviews with (or questionnaires completed by) third-party in-
formants, such as parents or teachers, who have significant ex-
perience interacting with the individual being evaluated.5 8 In-
formants should satisfy four criteria: (1) they should have contact
with the defendant almost every day, (2) their contacts should
generally last for at least several hours at a time, (3) they should
have had these contacts within the last several months, and (4)
they should have had opportunities to observe the variety of skills
measured by the adaptive behavior test.'59 Informants rate the
individual's typical behavior in settings with which they are fa-
miliar and they must report the individual's actual performance
as opposed to ability to perform. 160
Three main criteria should be considered by clinicians when se-
lecting a measure of adaptive behavior: (1) the reliability and va-
lidity of the measure, (2) the reliability of the informant, and (3)
the scope, structure, and clinical utility of the measure.'61 Meas-
ures should be chosen based on the purpose of the assessment,
the characteristics of the individual being tested, and the techni-
cal adequacy of the measure (for example, the normative sample
155. Id. at 110.
156. Stevens & Price, supra note 130, at 6.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id. at 6.
161. Candace H. Boan & Patti L. Harrison, Adaptive Behavior Assessment and Indi-
viduals with Mental Retardation, in ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RETARD-
ATION 33, 43 (Ronald L. Taylor ed., 1997).
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must include people without disabilities). 162 Three commonly used
tests are the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, the AAMR
Adaptive Behavior Scales, and the Scales of Independent Behav-
ior. 163
The reliability of adaptive behavior measures remains a seri-
ous concern. Reliability refers to the repeatability of a measure-
ment when administered by the same person (test-retest reliabil-
ity) and the degree of agreement when the measure is
administered by different people (inter-rater reliability). Most
published measures of adaptive behavior have acceptable levels of
reliability, as shown by mathematically calculated reliability coef-
ficients of at least 0.90.164 However, measures of adaptive behav-
ior assume that it is a trait rather than a temporary state, like
mood.16 As a trait, it is assumed to be accurately measurable by
administering the measure once. In contrast, if adaptive behavior
depends on environmental variables, a single administration
would not yield a reliable score.166
Specifically, the administration of measures of adaptive behav-
ior to a defendant who is incarcerated poses significant problems.
Many of the skills in the operational definition of adaptive behav-
ior are not relevant in prisons, such as self-direction, community
resources, and leisure skills. A mentally retarded person is also
likely to show stronger adaptive behavior in the structured envi-
ronment of a correctional facility than in society, thus possibly in-
flating scores that would have been indicative of mental retarda-
tion in the community environment.'67 Unfortunately, there will
162. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 13, 83-84.
163. Id. at 88-90. A relatively new measure that can be used to assess adaptive behav-
ior in adults up to 89 years old and that has received favorable reviews is the Adaptive
Behavior Assessment System - Second Edition (ABAS-II). Personal Communication from
James Morris, Director of Office of Forensic Services, Department Mental Health, Mental
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, Apr. 6, 2007.
164. See id. at 87-88.
165. Id.
166. Spreat, supra note 154, at 107. It is not uncommon for an individual to be able to
demonstrate a particular skill to one examiner but not another. Id. at 107-08.
167. Melissa Piaseki, handout, Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, Managing the
Capital Case in North Carolina Conference, The University of North Carolina, School of
Government and the National Judicial College (Mar.-Apr. 2006) available at http://www.
judges.unc.edu/200603CapitalCases/Bell%20-%2OPretrial%2OIssues%20(Mental%2ORetar
dadation).doc; Stevens & Price, supra note 130, at 19; Stanley L. Brodsky & Virginia A.
Galloway, Ethical and Professional Demands for Forensic Mental Health Professionals in
the Post-Atkins Era, 13 J. ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 3, 7 (2003).
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usually be no adaptive behavior test on record prior to the of-
fense. For this reason, it is important for experts conducting At-
kins evaluations to obtain information relating to the defendant's
adaptive skills before the offense occurred and prior to incarcera-
tion to augment whatever recent information is provided by in-
formants. Lawyers should make every effort to locate as many re-
cords as possible from schools, employers, health providers, and
government agencies so that evaluations of adaptive behavior
take into account information from all available sources. 16 8
The measures of adaptive behavior that are currently available
have several further limitations. Unless the informant is a par-
ent, he or she is unlikely to have extensive knowledge of the indi-
vidual's behavior in different settings. A teacher, for example,
would be able to speak to the individual's abilities at school but
not at home. Third-party informants may also have an inaccurate
perception of what is age-appropriate. For example, a teacher of
disabled children and a teacher of gifted children of the same age
would likely have different perceptions. Particularly important in
the context of the criminal justice system, parents or other infor-
mants may be influenced in their descriptions by their relation-
ship with the defendant and by their desire to help the defendant
avoid a death sentence. If an informant who has a close relation-
ship to the defendant realizes that the defendant may escape the
death penalty if the informant downplays the defendant's adap-
tive behavior, it is unlikely that the informant would be objective.
A final limitation of adaptive behavior measurement is that they
cannot be administered retrospectively and thus can only meas-
ure the defendant's current functioning. 169 Generally, measures of
adaptive behavior are not as objective as measures of intelligence;
consequently, clinical judgment matters even more in the context
of adaptive behavior than it does in the assessment of deficits in
intellectual functioning.
B. Definition and Assessment of Adaptive Behavior under the
Virginia Statute
The definition of mental retardation in the Virginia statute re-
quires "significant limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed
168. Stevens & Price, supra note 130, at 14.
169. Id. at 15-16.
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in conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills." 7 ° With re-
spect to the assessment of adaptive behavior, the statute states
that:
[Aldaptive behavior shall be based on multiple sources of informa-
tion, including clinical interview, psychological testing and educa-
tional, correctional and vocational records. The assessment shall in-
clude at least one standardized measure generally accepted by the
field of psychological testing for assessing adaptive behavior and ap-
propriate for administration to the particular defendant being as-
sessed, unless not feasible. In reaching a clinical judgment regarding
whether the defendant exhibits significant limitations in adaptive
behavior, the examiner shall give performance on standardized
measures whatever weight is clinically appropriate in light of the de-
fendant's history and characteristics and the context of the assess-
ment. 
1 7 1
This language was substantively identical to the language
originally proposed by the CAG.'72 The drafters envisioned that a
standardized measure of adaptive behavior would ordinarily be
administered in Atkins cases in the absence of a compelling clini-
cal or scientific demonstration of infeasibility, such as the absence
of a measure taking into account certain disabilities or a virtually
life-long history of confinement.173 The leeway provided in the
statute for a decision to forgo an adaptive behavior test contrasts
with the statute's clear requirement that a test of intellectual
functioning must always be administered.'74 This difference in
language was created to reflect the differences between standard-
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
172. The CAG report dated Oct. 17, 2002, recommended:
Assessment of adaptive behavior should be based on multiple sources of in-
formation, including clinical interview, psychological testing and educational,
correctional, and vocational records, and should, whenever feasible, include
at least one standardized measure for assessing adaptive behavior, adminis-
tered in accordance with methods generally accepted by the field and appro-
priate for the particular person being assessed, taking into account the envi-
ronments in which the person has lived as well as cultural, linguistic,
sensory, motor, behavioral and other individual factors. In reaching a clinical
judgment regarding whether the person exhibits "substantial limitations in
adaptive behavior," the examiner should give performance on standardized
measures whatever weight is clinically appropriate in light of the person's
history and characteristics and the context of the assessment.
CAG Report, Oct. 17, 2002, supra note 72.
173. See id.
174. "Assessment of intellectual functioning shall include administration of at least one
standardized measure generally accepted by the field of psychological testing .... " VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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ized measures of intelligence and adaptive behavior. In particu-
lar, it was designed to reflect scientists' comparatively less devel-
oped understanding of adaptive behavior and its measurement,
as well as the more subjective nature of measures of adaptive be-
havior which may be difficult to administer accurately in a prison
setting.
Based on the language in the AAMR definition, the statute's
definition of mental retardation requires that an individual pos-
sess "significant limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills."175 This language
reflects an important ambiguity: Does the use of the conjunction
"and" imply that significant limitations must be found in all three
domains? The answer is no; the AAMR Manual explicitly states
that in the context of measuring adaptive behavior, an individual
need only score at least two standard deviations below the mean
in at least one domain.'76 If that is so, why didn't the AAMR defi-
nition use "or" instead of "and"?
The confusion created by the AAMR definition can be dispelled
by highlighting the important distinction between the concept of
adaptive behavior on the one hand, and the tests used to measure
deficits in adaptive behavior on the other. Although the construct
of adaptive behavior includes significant deficits in all three do-
mains, the AAMR operationalizes significant limitations in adap-
tive behavior as a score at least two standard deviations below
the mean either on a test of one type of adaptive behavior or in a
composite test of all three types.' 77 In other words, people diag-
nosed with mental retardation must have significant limitations
in adaptive behavior by definition and must have some meaning-
ful limitation in all three domains. A score of at least two stan-
dard deviations below the mean on a standardized test is re-
quired in only one domain to document and support the diagnosis.
When the problem is understood as a measurement problem
rather than a conceptual problem, one wonders why a perform-
ance at least two standard deviations below the mean in one do-
main is regarded as sufficient to support the diagnosis. Several
reasons have been offered. First and most important, adaptive
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added).
176. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 36, at 78.
177. Id. at 13.
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behavior is viewed as a unitary concept."'7 Thus, generally speak-
ing, substantial limitations in one domain are likely to be accom-
panied by substantial limitations in the other two domains.' 79
However, at the present time, correlations in performance across
the three domains vary significantly among different instru-
ments. 80 As a result, if a score at least two standard deviations
below the mean were required in more than one domain, the
choice of instrument would have a significant impact on whether
a person is found to be significantly limited in their adaptive be-
havior.
In addition, when an individual has a score at least two stan-
dard deviations below the mean in one domain, that limitation in
itself will usually have such a major adverse effect on the person's
adaptive functioning to qualify them as having a substantial limi-
tation in adaptive behavior generally.' A final reason for requir-
ing a score in only one domain is that the probability of someone
scoring at least two standard deviations below the mean on more
than one of the three domains is very low at the present time,
given the tests that are now in use. 82 Requiring scores more than
two standard deviations below the mean in all three domains
would likely exclude nearly all individuals with "mild" retarda-
tion (i.e., with scores in the range of 60-70 on the customary IQ
tests) from qualifying for the diagnosis. In other words, when
viewed cumulatively, the available tests are not valid.
The Clinical Advisory Group discussed this problem at length.
Recognizing that the practical significance of the definitional lan-
guage lies in its impact on expert testimony and arguments by
counsel and jury instructions, the CAG considered the possibility
of altering the confusing AAMR language to change "and" to "or,"
in congruence with the AAMR's directions regarding testing and
diagnosis. However, the CAG decided that making such a change
would likely be regarded as an attempt to change rather than
clarify the AAMR definition and would raise suspicion about the
CAG's motives. The CAG therefore decided to leave the AAMR
definition intact. Preserving the AAMR definition also carries im-
178. Id. at 74.
179. Id. at 74.
180. Id. at 78.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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portant symbolic value since it embodies a commitment to scien-
tific objectivity in the definition and diagnosis of mental retarda-
tion-a key implication of the Atkins decision.
That being said, it is important for witnesses, attorneys, and
courts to understand the particular subtlety in the definition of
mental retardation. The definition envisions significant deficits in
all three domains. However, when it comes to the testing of defi-
cits in adaptive behavior, the diagnosis is supported by signifi-
cant limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual,
social, or practical skills. Courts must be careful to avoid an in-
terpretation of the statute that requires scores at least two stan-
dard deviations below the mean in all three domains. Otherwise,
courts will impose far more demanding requirements for a diag-
nosis of mental retardation than were intended by the scientists
who drafted the AAMR definition and are used in clinical prac-
tice.
In light of the drafting history just described, it will come as no
surprise that the CAG and the Crime Commission drafters
strongly resisted proposals to resolve the ambiguity in the AAMR
definition in the other direction-i.e., by requiring proof that the
defendant had substantial deficits in all three domains. The
AAMR definition was embraced unchanged in the bill that
emerged from the Senate. 183 However, as indicated earlier, the
bill that emerged from the House had added a "diminished capac-
ity" requirement to the AAMR definition." 4 When the two bills
were reconciled by the Joint Conference Committee on February
22, 2003, the compromise entailed dropping the House's "dimin-
ished capacity" language while modifying the AAMR definition of
adaptive behavior to require "significant limitations in adaptive
behavior as expressed in all of the following: conceptual adaptive
skills, social adaptive skills and practical adaptive skills."185 After
183. S. 1239, as originally introduced in the Senate by Senator Norment, discarded the
Crime Commission's definition of adaptive behavior in favor of a definition based on the
language of DSM IV. S. 1239 offered January 8, 2003, § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A). However, the
Senate Courts of Justice Committee rejected the Norment bill in favor of the Crime Com-
mission's proposal introduced by Senator Stolle (originally S. 1141). Technically, the
Crime Commission's bill became an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute for S. 1239
reported out of Committee on January 22, 2003.
184. H. COMM. FOR COURTS OF JUSTICE, AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE,
S. 1239, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003).
185. JOINT CONF. COMM., AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE, S. 1239, 2003
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) (emphasis added).
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consultation with the CAG chair, the Governor recommended
that the AAMR definition be restored, and this recommendation
was accepted by the Senate (39-0) and by the House (47-44)."86
This was a critical victory for the Crime Commission proposal.
IV. DEVELOPMENTAL ORIGIN
The requirement in the definition of mental retardation that
the disability become manifest before the age of eighteen is in-
tended to differentiate between mental retardation and intellec-
tual deficits "acquired" after the developmental period, typically
due to brain injuries or brain diseases such as dementia. As dis-
cussed earlier, it can be argued that people with "acquired" defi-
cits in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior equivalent
to those associated with mental retardation should also be ex-
empted from the death penalty because there is no reason to
think that the age at which the disability becomes manifest is
relevant to the disabled person's culpability at the time of the of-
fense. 187 Based on that reasoning, the American Bar Association
and the mental health professional associations have endorsed a
broadened statement of the Atkins principle.,88 Be that as it may,
however, most current statutes, including Virginia's, confine the
exemption to "mental retardation" and therefore include devel-
opmental origin as part of the definition.8 9
The developmental origin limitation has some practical advan-
tages in an Atkins adjudication because requiring onset before
age eighteen also reduces the danger of malingering.190 The dis-
ability must have manifested during the defendant's childhood
and thus prior to the creation of any incentives to appear men-
tally retarded in order to avoid the death penalty. Although ma-
lingering that escapes detection by clinicians has not been found
to be a significant concern in the diagnosis of mental retardation,
the age-of-onset criterion should eliminate any concern that de-
186. Legislative Information Systems Bill Tracking, Summary of S. 1239 (2003 Reg.
Sess.).
187. See supra note 43.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618
(2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2006).
190. See supra note 43; Tobolowsky, supra note 38, at 99.
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fendants may somehow be able to feign impaired cognitive func-
tioning. '9
It must be emphasized, however, that requiring a finding of de-
velopmental onset does not require that the diagnosis have been
made before the age of eighteen or that standardized testing used
to support the diagnosis have been administered before the age of
eighteen. 192 Such a requirement would be unconstitutional be-
cause it would amount to discrimination against people whose
need for special education was overlooked and who did not have
access to adequate clinical or social services as a child. The age-
of-onset requirement therefore only requires that there is evi-
dence, not necessarily test scores, that intellectual and adaptive
deficits became manifest before the age of eighteen. 93 Further-
more, if a defendant is shown by testing and history to have men-
tal retardation, and there is no suspicion of malingering,'94 it
should be presumed that its onset was before the age of eighteen
in the absence of any evidence of later onset, such as brain injury
sustained in adulthood or the dementia.
In sum, the developmental onset requirement, though diagnos-
tically essential, does very little work in the ordinary Atkins ad-
judication. Scores on standardized tests before age eighteen
should, all things being equal, be accorded greater weight than
tests administered in adulthood. Courts should carefully consider
any other evidence from the developmental period. However,
courts should not require a diagnosis before the age of eighteen or
scores in the range of mental retardation from IQ tests adminis-
tered before the age of eighteen. Courts should regard tests ad-
ministered during adulthood (even after the capital offense) as
highly probative on the diagnosis of mental retardation. Finally,
courts should presume that currently diagnosed mental retarda-
tion had a developmental onset in the absence of clear evidence of
post-childhood onset of the defendant's disability.
191. Ellis, supra note 26, at 13-14. Any suspicions of malingering in relation to current
testing can be pursued by assembling evidence regarding manifestations of deficits in in-
tellectual functioning and adaptive behavior before the offense, especially during child-
hood. Such evidence may substantiate malingering, and therefore undermine the diagno-
sis. Because malingering is so difficult to carry out successfully, such cases should be rare.
192. See Tobolowsky, supra note 38, at 99.
193. See id.
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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V. EXPERTS IN ATKINS CASES
Expert testimony plays a crucial role in Atkins determinations.
It is important that courts have access to high quality profes-
sional opinions, but also to a sufficient breadth of expert opinion.
The Virginia statute requires experts appointed by the court to
conduct Atkins evaluations (at the request of either the defense or
the Commonwealth) have a combination of (i) specialized exper-
tise in the assessment of mental retardation and (ii) specialized
training in conducting forensic evaluations.19 The mental health
expert must be,
(a) a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist or an individual with a doc-
torate degree in clinical psychology, (b) skilled in the administration,
scoring and interpretation of intelligence tests and measures of
adaptive behavior and (c) qualified by experience and by specialized
training, approved by the Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, to perform forensic
evaluations. 196
This language was designed to accomplish several things. First,
by requiring expertise in administering, scoring, and interpreting
intelligence tests and measures of adaptive behavior, the state
will limit the pool of experts qualified for appointment for state-
subsidized evaluations to experts in the diagnosis of mental re-
tardation, thereby ruling out the mental health clinicians, espe-
cially psychiatrists, who carry out the vast majority of forensic
assessments in criminal cases. The expertise envisioned by the
statute encompasses the range of topics reviewed in this paper,
including technical issues such as the Flynn effect and the meas-
urement of deficits in adaptive behavior that are outside the ken
of many mental health clinicians.197 Second, the requirement of
forensic expertise, modeled after analogous provisions governing
other mental health evaluations in criminal cases, was designed
to assure that the appointed experts are familiar with the legal
context of the evaluations. 9 ' The practical effect of this require-
ment is that experts in the mental retardation services system
195. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
196. Id.
197. See supra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying notes 177-82 (discussing the Flynn
effect and explaining measurement of deficit in adaptive behavior).
198. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004) with VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-169.5 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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who want to conduct Atkins evaluations must enroll in an inten-
sive training course approved by the Commissioner of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services.199
It is important to emphasize that this provision governs the
appointment of experts to conduct state-subsidized evaluations in
connection with Atkins adjudications. °° It was not designed to
govern or limit the pool of witnesses who are qualified to offer ex-
pert opinions in Atkins adjudications, a task that belongs to the
judiciary.201 For example, an expert retained by the defense who
has recognized expertise in special education and experience in
diagnosing mental retardation may be highly qualified to evalu-
ate a capital defendant for purposes of an Atkins adjudication and
to offer an opinion on that subject, even though he or she does not
have a degree in clinical psychology or specialized forensic train-
ing. Exclusion of an otherwise admissible opinion by an otherwise
qualified expert would not only constitute a misinterpretation of
the statute, but would violate the defendant's right to present his
case in mitigation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
These observations are relevant to the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision in its most recent review of Daryl Atkins's case.
In Atkins v. Commonwealth (Atkins V), a clinical psychologist,
Stanton Samenow, was appointed by the court on the Common-
wealth's motion to conduct an evaluation of Atkins under section
19.2-264.3:1.2(A). °2 Dr. Samenow conceded that he had never
administered a standardized measure of adaptive behavior, al-
though he testified that he routinely assessed adaptive behavior
in other ways.20 3 The court held that his opinion on the diagnosis
of mental retardation was inadmissible because he was not
"'skilled' in the administration of measures of adaptive behavior
199. The training is conducted by the University of Virginia Institute of Law, Psychia-
try and Public Policy under contract with the Department of Mental Health, Mental Re-
tardation and Substance Abuse Services and the Office of the Attorney General. Training
Calendar, Institute of Law, Psychiatry & Public Policy, University of Virginia School of
Law & School of Medicine, http://www.ilppp.virginia.edu/trainingcalendar.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2007).
200. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
201. See Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (Va. 1995)
("The admission of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.") (quoting Brown v. Corbin, 423 S.E.2d 176, 178 (Va. 1992)).
202. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 631 S.E.2d 93, 96 (Va. 2006).
203. Id. at 97-98.
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. . . . [and] lack[ed] the requisite expertise in scoring and inter-
preting such tests," and thus not qualified to be appointed as a
state expert.20 4 The court made clear that in the context of adap-
tive behavior, the expert does not actually have to administer a
standardized measure of adaptive behavior to the defendant, but
only needs to be skilled in scoring and interpreting such meas-
ures.2"5 If the expert has these necessary skills and determines
that administering a standardized measure would be infeasible or
inappropriate in a given case, he can testify as to the defendant's
mental retardation and explain why an adaptive behavior test
was not given.20 6 While the basic qualifications possessed by the
expert may go to the admissibility of his opinion, the court said,
the decision by a qualified expert about which test to administer
only goes to the weight of his opinion.207
Although the court reached the correct result in Atkins V re-
garding the admissibility of Dr. Samenow's testimony, the court's
rationale needs a little elaboration. As indicated above, the quali-
fications specified in section 19.2-264.3:1.2(A) relate to the ap-
pointment of experts, not to the qualifications of witnesses to of-
fer expert opinions, a judgment that should be governed by the
customary criteria regarding the qualification of a person as an
expert. 20 ' Accordingly, if Dr. Samenow had been called to testify,
not as an expert appointed under section 19.2-264.3:1.2(A), but
rather as an expert retained by one of the parties, his opinion
would have been admissible if he had been found to be skilled in
the diagnosis of mental retardation.2 9 In this hypothesized situa-
tion, the alleged deficiencies of his evaluation-including failing
to administer a test of adaptive behavior and administering a
WAIS-III two days after Atkins had taken the test in another
evaluation-would bear on the weight that should be given his
opinion. '10 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia properly held
204. Id. at 98.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 98-99.
207. Id. at 99. The Court also noted that Dr. Samenow's decision to administer the
WAIS-III two days after another psychologist had given Atkins the same test would not
render his opinion inadmissible either; it would bear on the weight his opinion should be
given. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
208. See supra note 201.
209. See id.
210. Dr. Samenow actually had a plausible reason for questioning the usefulness of a
test of adaptive behavior in Atkins's case. He testified, "I don't think it would have been a
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that Dr. Samenow's opinion was inadmissible in Atkins V because
he was erroneously appointed by the court to conduct the evalua-
tion in the first place, and there is no other way, aside from ex-
clusion, to enforce the restrictions on appointment of experts set
forth in section 19.2-264.3:1.2(A). 211
In sum, the ultimate aim of the training and assessment re-
quirements specified in the Virginia statute is to assure that At-
kins evaluations are of the highest possible quality. Training pro-
grams for experts in Atkins cases should be developed by all
states, even in the absence of an explicit legislative directive.
Such programs should be jointly developed by the state supreme
courts and the executive departments responsible for delivering
and regulating mental retardation health services. The program
should include the requisite training in forensic evaluation so
that non-forensic specialists will understand the legal context of
the assessment and the expectations courts will have of the evi-
dence they provide. Training should further ensure that experts
have an understanding of the features of mental retardation as-
sessment that are particularly pertinent to Atkins evaluations
and are particularly susceptible to challenges based on lack of va-
lidity or reliability. Experts need to be aware of the boundaries of
scientific consensus in relation to the assessment of mental retar-
dation. In particular, the construct of adaptive behavior should be
emphasized in light of the uncertainties surrounding its meas-
urement.212 Finally, training programs should explicitly address
the potential for bias in conducting forensic evaluations, espe-
cially in capital cases, and the ways in which experts can try to
maintain their objectivity.213
CONCLUSION
Implementing the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins presents
a host of challenges to the states. In its unprecedented ruling, At-
kins makes the diagnosis of mental retardation a matter of life or
valid or reliable measure because [Atkins] had been incarcerated for quite some time. It
would have had to have been retroactive. I think there are many ways to assess adaptive
functioning that would be more informative." See Atkins, 631 S.E.2d at 97.
211. Id.at98.
212. Currently, there is no accepted standard of practice for evaluating the adaptive
behavior of defendants in death penalty cases. See Stevens & Price, supra note 130, at 20.
213. Brodsky & Galloway, supra note 167, at 5.
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death. It is therefore imperative that state courts and legislatures
make every effort to assure the scientific integrity and fairness of
Atkins evaluations and adjudications. These diagnoses involve
scientific and clinical nuance, particularly in the mild range of
disability. In order to effectuate the Supreme Court's mandate
faithfully and fairly, legislatures should conform their legislation
as closely as possible to current scientific understanding, and
should prescribe requirements for assessments designed to assure
that evaluations are of the highest possible quality. Lawyers and
judges should make a concerted effort to understand the defini-
tion of mental retardation and its measurement from a clinical
perspective. In particular, courts must become familiar with sci-
entific knowledge and clinical practice in the field of mental re-
tardation.
Special attention should be paid to the interpretation of IQ
scores and the meaning and measurement of adaptive behavior.
With respect to intellectual functioning, standard error of meas-
urement, the Flynn effect, practice effects, and other factors-
especially when taken together-can influence IQ scores signifi-
cantly. Courts should recognize and help juries understand that
IQ scores should rarely be taken at face value and that profes-
sional practice standards play a crucial part in the interpretation
of test scores. With respect to adaptive behavior-a construct
more difficult to understand and apply than intelligence-courts
need to understand its importance within the diagnosis of mental
retardation. Courts should also recognize that it will be of par-
ticular relevance, as well as most challenging, in cases involving
defendants with IQ scores in the upper range of mental retarda-
tion.
While careful application of current clinical understanding of
mental retardation is important in all Atkins cases, the subtleties
and the difficulties of using scientific standards in a legal setting
are most pronounced when the defendant arguably falls within
the mild range of mental retardation. In the end, clinical judg-
ment plays an inescapable role in diagnosis in these cases. The
challenge facing the courts, acknowledged by the Supreme Court
in Atkins, is to adjudicate these borderline cases in a fair and
consistent manner.
[Vol. 41:811
